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MiR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS. Edited by Felix Frankfurter. With an Intro-
duction by Oliver Wendell Holmes. New Haven: Yale University
Press. pp. 232. $3.
FOR those who were born and brought up in the faith that ours is a government
of laws and not of men, the growing interest of both lawyers and laymen in
the personality, background and outlook of some of our leading judges, as an
aid to understanding the business of judging, must seem like tilting at wind-
mills. The idea that judges do not make or create the law, but only search
out what is already in existence and apply it to the case in hand, did not die
with Blackstone. "Men do not make laws," writes Calvin Coolidge. "They do
but discover them-. That ttate is most fortunate in its form of govern-
ment which has the aptest instrument for the discovery of laws."
Few persons have played a more important part than Mr. Justice Brandeis
in dispelling this delusion that judges do not have a direct hand in the maling
of the law. In the now almost legendary battle over his appointment to the
Supreme Court in 1916 and in his r~le as a dissenter, Mr.,Justice Brandeis
has, in a relatively passive manner, driven home the thought that the job of
a judge is something more than discovering and matching precedents. Senators,
lawyers and the lay public may have been following a false scent, but the fact
is that a searching investigation of the man and his philosophy was considered
necessary to determine his qualifications as a judge. Discovery may be the
chief function of the judge's craft, but precedents seemed to hunt in pairs,
when in the selfsame case Holmes and Brandeis "found the lawe' to be one
thing and the majority of the Supreme Court the exact opposite.
In a more active way, Mr. Justice Brandeis has also clearly pointed out that
the bondage of precedent does not and should not absolutely fetter judicial law
making. In the sorties and retreats of the Supreme Court on the pitched field
of stare decisis, Mr. Justice Brandeis has consistently and repeatedly illus-
trated how the court practices the fine art of judicial government by amending,
modifying, distinguishing and overruling its own decisions. "The process of
inclusion and exclusion, so often applied in developing a rule, cannot end with
its first enunciation. The rule as announced must be tentative. For the many
and varying facts to -which it will be applied cannot be foreseen. Modification
implies growth. It is the life of the law." (Washington v. Dawson & Co., 2G4
U. S. 219, 236.) Realizing the paradox that law should be certain and stable
and subject at the same time to progressive change, Mr. Justice Brandeis does
not think that mere modification alone has and will always balance the de-
mands of progress and the needs of stability. Often the law has and can best
be made by unmaking and overruling previous decisions. "Stare dceisis," writes
Air. Justice Brandeis, "is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it
is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be
right. * * * But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where cor-
rection through legislation is practically impossible, this Court has often over-
ruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the
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force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so
fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function."
(Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406.)
Recently Mr. Justice Brandeis has sown an idea, which may in time make
stare decisis a subject of only morphological interest to students of Supreme
Court history. To him stare decisis is only an embodiment of the wise policy
of usually following applicable rules of law; it has little, if anything, to do with
dictating that a court should follow prior judicial determinations of acot.
(Burnet v. Coronado, supra, p. 411.) Even admitting that there is not always
a bright judicial line dividing fact from law, most of the great questions before
the Supreme Court involve questions of fact. When is a Federal statute such
a substantial and direct burden upon the governmental functions of a state as
to be invalid; when is a state statute so unreasonable and arbitrary as to be
violative of the due process clause; when is an admitted statutory burden upon
interstate commerce so substantial and direct as to invalidate it; when is a
statutory classification so unreasonable as to run counter to the equal pro-
tection clause?-all these and many other analogous questions certainly in-
volve more of fact than they do of law.
With such a slant we may well expect an increasing decline in the power of
stare decisis to limit changes in the Supreme Court decisions. Whether or
not this view of Mr. Justice Brandeis has as yet filtered through to the other
members of the Court is, of course, problematical; but it is interesting to note
the Court's most recent illustration of the knack of overruling. About four
years ago the Supreme Court, in Long v. Rockwood (277 U. S. 142), held
invalid a Massachusetts statute taxing the gross receipts of royalties from
patent rights on the ground that it constituted a substantial and direct burden
upon an instrumentality of the Federal Government. This year the Court by
a unanimous decision in Fox Film v. Doyal (286 U. S. 123), a case involving
a similar tax on copyright royalties, candidly said that there was no valid
distinction between patents and copyrights for this purpose, and frankly over-
ruled Long v. Rockwood. Surprisingly enough, three of the judges, Van Do-
vanter, McReynolds and Butler, who voted with the majority in Long v. Rock-
wood, took an about face in Fox Film v. Doyal. Perhaps Mr. Justice Brandeis
has shown his brethren when and why stare decisis is not one of the "inexorable
commands" in the judicial governing process.
But Mr. Justice Brandeis has not halted his task by merely illustrating that
ours is more often a government of mer, than of laws. What is probably more
important, he has helped to show how judges should make the law. Qualitative
bases, and by the same token almost incommunicable ones, have for centuries
been the chief factors in the judicial process. Whether or not, for example, a
State statute regulating the hours of labor of women was a reasonable exercise
of the police power in protecting the health and morals of the State was and
still is to a large extent argued in a vacuum. Counsel for both sides usually
marshal precedents to show in what analogous cases regulation has been held
constitutional and where it has not. In most of the important cases the previous
analogies are, to say the least, often remote. In advance of decision in such a
case it is almost impossible to tell, from the previous decisions, what the Supreme
Court will decide, and once they did decide there was no objective or quantita-
tive indication that the decision would accomplish a socially desirable result.
About all that happened was the obtaining of the composite best guess of a
majority of the Supreme Court Justices. Mr. Brandeis' contribution to the
traditional technique of arguing and deciding cases is now one of the "t-wice-
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told tales" of the law. In his now famous brief in Muller v. Orcgon, in support
of the Oklahoma statute limiting the hours of women workers, he gathered
together a wealth of non-legal material showing the results of similar legis-
lation both abroad and in this country; he presented to the court statistical
data showing, among other things, the effects of long hours of work upon the
physical health and the morals of the women workers, and upon the physical
health of their offspring; and he collated the consensus of informed non-legal
opinion on the subject. In winning the case, Mr. Brandeis also helped to win
the Court over to a recognition that quantitative indications of the social desir-
ability of a statute or decision ought to be given the imprimatur of some
authority.
When Mr. Justice Holmes remarked some thirty-five years ago that the man
of the future in law would not be the master of precedents but the man of
statistics and the master of economics, he probably little realized that Mr.
Brandeis would be the man to break these new paths, but nevertheless he would
no doubt now classify Mr. Brandeis as an apt illustration of what he meant
by his observation. Although the obtaining of quantitative indices in most
fields of the law seems improbable-as improbable, no doubt, as man's flying
seemed from the dawn of thought to the beginning of the twentieth century-
Mr. Justice Brandeis has taken some steps forward. Only time's verdict can
tell whether his quest for some better method of tying up law with life is
worth while or merely a hunt for the crock of gold.
Most of what has merely been indicated here and infinitely more is admirably
told by Felix Frankfurter's collection of essays originally published by the
Columbia and Harvard Law Reviews and the Yale Law Journal upon the
occasion of Mr. Justice Brandeis' seventy-fifth birthday. Although these essays
do not profess to give a full length portrait of Mr. Justice Brandeis as a man
and judge, they mirror many aspects of his powerful mind and unique career
in fine and fascinating prose. The contributions of the two non-lawyers, the
essay of Max. Lerner on The Social Tiought of Mr. Jwstico Brandeis and that of
Walton H. Hamilton on The Jurist's Art are probably the best from the lawyer's
as well as the layman's point of view. To say this, however, does not detract
greatly from the quality of the others. For those who have worked up pre-
judices against the attitudes and supposedly non-liberal views of Chief Justice
Hughes, his essay will probably come as a refreshing surprise. Felix Frank-
furter has paralleled his work on the relationship of Holme. to the Constitution
with his present essay on Brandeis. Henry Wolf Bikle and Donald Richberg
portray the supremacy of Brandeis' contributions in specialized fields; and
topping all is Oliver Wendell Holmes' one page introduction into which he has
packed what most of us could not say as well in a volume. Viewed as a whole,
this collection of essays has the power and passion of Mr. Brandeis himself,
whose contagion few of us, even if we wanted to, could resist.
New York City. OSCAR Cox.
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THE BANKERS IN BOLIVIA. A" Study in Foreign Investment. By Margaret
Alexander Marsh. New York: The Vanguard Press. 1928. pp. xvi,
233. $1.
THE AMERICANS IN SANTO DOMINGO. By Melvin M. Knight. New York:
The Vanguard Press. 1928. pp. xix, 189. $1.
THE CAPITALISTS IN COLOMBIA. By J. Fred Rippy. New York: The
Vanguard Press. 1931. pp. xxxii, 256. $2.
PORTO Rico: A BROKEN PLEDGE. By Bailey W. and Justine Whitfield
Diffie. New York: The Vanguard Press. 1931. pp. xxxv, 252. $1.
EXTENsmvs as both popular and scientific inquiry into expansion has been, it has
nevertheless been dominated by a highly' monistic view of society and of im-
perialistic processes. It is undeniable that state activity has played an extremely
active role in expansion. It is equally certain that the extension of the au-
thority of the stronger powers has been frequently an important consequence.
Yet surely it is an archaic juristic metaphysic which stresses the exertion of
political force or the maiming of an "individual sovereignty" of backward
peoples as the essential phenomenon in imperialism. For domination is not only
by or for the state. Any social order may seek it of design or exert it without
intent. Patterns of behavior, too, have their tenacles of dominance. Expansion
is at least as much an economic and a cultural process as it is a political one,
It is not state action alone which is provocative of conflict or injurious to com-
munity sentiment. In the case of the Americas, especially, it seems probable
that governmental behavior is not the crux of the expansion problem.
It is the merit of the series to which the books under review belong that it
does not view. imperialism as a monistic phenomenon. It breaks definitely with
the definitions which have circumscribed both liberal and Marxian speculation
and investigation in this field. The series is aware of the coexistence of at
least two processes. It does not view the political process, whether as end or
instrument, as the only figure in the picture. It finds its unifying theme In
the multiple interrelations of politics with concomitant economic processes in
American expansion.
The individual studies illustrate this theme in various ways, their differences
being determined partly by the data, partly by preferences of the authors,
Mrs. Marsh's compact study reveals processes almost purely economic at work
in Bolivia. It is an admirable interpretation of the uneconomic effects of an
avalanche of loans upon an area of limited resources. When it was first pub-
lished, this work was sneered at by "new era boys". But events have turned
greatly to its credit for scientific prescience, as well as to the misfortune of
sundry salesmen and investors in Bolivian bonds.
Professor Knight's study of Santo Domingo provides perhaps the clearest
illustration of the distinctness of political and economic processes. It is at the
same time a mine of wisdom upon the nature of economic expansion itself. It
is regrettable that exigencies of publication caused Professor Knight's equally
penetrating analysis of political action prompted by economic interest to be
seriously mutilated. The best part of the book as published is in the last
three chapters.
Professor Rippy has found political and economic action working in close
harmony in Colombia. His principal argument is, however, that the diplomatic
policy of the United States government toward Colombia has been dictated
largely by economic and financial considerations.
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Porto Rico is the first dependency of the United States to be included in
the series. Mr. and Mrs. Diffie have concentrated upon the social economics
of the island. In doing so, their inquiry has proceeded somewhat beyond the
field of "relations." It tends to include the impact of the Insular government
and politicians as well as that of Washington upon the economic life of Porto
Rico. As a result the impression of the effects of American dominance as
such is somewhat blurred. A good account is rendered, however, of the in-
jurious results of absentee ownership, of the privileged position of the sugar
industry, and of Porto Rico's inclusion within a tariff wall conceived solely
in the interests of the mainland.
All of the books display ample competence in research and are commendably
free from the sentimentality either of the business promoter or of the social
evangelist. They break new ground fruitfully in the study of imperialism.
One point made in common by all the books in the series, with the exception of
Professor Rippy's, deserves emphasis. The processes of em-pansion have thus
far scarcely begun to transmit the pattern of the economic life of the United
States to the regions with which we have been most concerned. Here is one
of the most salient facts in modern politics and economics-the persistent
backwardness of the backward countries. This is a matter which deserves
closer scrutiny. It is possible that even bank directors as well as Marxians
and romantic reactionaries might give it thoughtful attention to their ad-
vantage.
Wellesley College. LmEAwD HAmILTON JuxNxs.
THE HOLDING COMPANY. Its Public Significance and Its Regulation.
By James C. Bonbright and Gardiner C. Means. New York: McGraw
Hill Book Co., Inc. 1932. pp. xv, 398. $4.
Tum Holding Company is one of the startling innovations that came "only
yesterday." Save for a few sporadic instances of legislative favoritism it dates
from 1888. In that year the New Jersey General Incorporation Act first made
it possible for any one willing to pay the fees to organize a corporation with
unrestricted power to hold stock in other corporations. Gradually the bar
learned to make use of this privilege and other states saw the revenue raising
advantages of charter mongering. Today it would seem almost as revolutionary
to do away with intercorporate stockholdings as to abolish trusts. For the
ability to organize holding, subsidiary and affiliate corporations has meant to
the modern corporation lawyer what the Chancellor's protection of uses meant
to the fourteenth century conveyancer-an escape from legal restrictions -hich
had been framed for an earlier and simpler society, and which were championed
by those who strove ineffectually to block new economic trends.
-The modern lawyer's corporate and corporation-dominating clients were
hemmed in by a multitude of vexing legal restrictions, federal and state, and
differing from state to state. They might be required to pay taxes, unreason-
ably high, discriminatory, and even double; "to reveal" to their numerous
scattered stockholders and thereby to let their rivals and the public learn too
much about the business; and to forego lucrative advantages from collateral
activity beyond the powers of the corporation. A majority desiring to pro-
mote a combination might be forced to pay hold-up prices to dissenters who
could invoke rules requiring unanimous consent to changes in their contract
of association. Promises to prior bondholders to subject after acquired prop-
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erty to the lien of their mortgages might seem to cramp the future develop-
ment of the business. Great corporations might think that decentralization
would promote efficiency. Desire to stabilize the management of a corporation
and to permit those with a minority of investment interest to stipulate for
control might run afoul of dogma that voting power cannot be separated from
ownership. Financial wizards might wish to pyramid securities in order to
build up vast empires with a great deal of other people's money and very
little of their own. Investors might hesitate to buy if they saw too many prior
charges ahead of what was offered them. Attempts might be made to limit
public utilities to what someone else considered a reasonable profit, and even to
control their financing. In these and many other situations, clever lawyers have
done much to evade and minimize the obstacles in the way of their clients.
Most commonly, some form of holding company has worked the magic.
Today holding companies are on the defensive. Tax collectors and regulatory
commissions have come to demand power to deal with businesses as economic
units without regard to formal division into separate corporate entities. They
are more and more commanding the ear of courts and legislatures. Ex-
haustive investigations of the use of holding companies in the public utility
and railroad fields have made information available and focused public atten-
tion on the use of the device by lawyers. Depression has furnished hindsight
wisdom to those wha ignored occasional warnings of the dangers of compli-
cated and highly pyramided financial structures. We have seen the crash of
institutions but recently so proud and mighty: The Bank of United States,
Insull Utility Investments, Inc., Kreuger and Toll. We have seen a tremendous
deflation of the value of all holding company securities. The time is ripe for
reform. There is danger lest it be blind, superficial and futile, outlawing the
institution which has been abused, without saving it for the situations where
it is socially desirable, and without reaching the abuse itself.
Bonbright and Means are therefore most timely in bringing out their book.
It offers a comprehensive summary of available information as to' the holding
company; its history, its specialized uses in the industrial, public utility, rail-
road and banking fields, and its connection with current issues as to the scope
of public control over businesses. The authors' interest in holding companies
is a by-product of their interest in utilities. Hence they have directed their
attention primarily to the utility holding company, and its closest parallel in the
railroad field. They present detailed descriptions of the principal systems,
illustrating with charts the small financial stake of those who dominate them,
and developing a convincing argument for subjecting the holding company
to the same regulation as the operating company. An appendix by Maurice
Mound of the New York Bar draws on reported cases to illustrate the charges
of mismanagement which have been made against holding companies in suits
by stockholders and creditors of their subsidiaries. The authors are to be
congratulated on the clearness with which they state 'essential issues, their
fairnessfin assembling the arguments on both sides, and the perspective which
they give of the relation between economic problem and legal formula, and
between the holding company and alternative legal devices for accomplishing
similar purposes. The book is an invaluable adjunct to strictly legal materials
for any one wishing to acquaint himself with some of the vital problems of
modern corporation law.
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THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA. By Chirakaikaran Joseph Chacko. New York: Columbia
University Press. 1932. pp. 431. $5.50.
THs volume, composed of nine chapters and four appendices, deals with the
functions of the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, in
connection with the boundary waters between the two countries and cognate
questions. The Commission -was established bi the two Governments pursuant
to provisions of the Boundary Waters Treaty concluded between the United
States and Great Britain, on January 11, 1909. In the first chapter of the
book the author gives a brief description of the boundary waters and connecting
canals, and sets forth statistics showing their importance in marine transpor-
tation and in the development of hydro-electric power. This chapter also con-
tains a brief discussion of pertinent provisions of treaties between the United
States and Great Britain beginning with the Treaty of Peace of 1783 and
ending with the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, just mentioned. The suc-
ceeding chapters discuss the creation of the International Joint Commission,
its powers, functions, and methods of procedure. The author properly observe3
that the Commission is empowered to exercise judicial, investigative and ad-
ministrative functions. But, that while it is empowered by the Treaty to act
as an arbitral tribunal when a question or matter of difference between the
High Contracting Parties is referred to it, the functions thus far performed
have pertained principally to granting, or withholding, approval of applications
for permission to place obstructions in or make diversions from the boundary
waters, and to making investigations and reports to the two Governments, with
recommendations, on questions or matters of difference referred to it pursuant
to Article IX of the Treaty of 1909. Outstanding instances of the latter char-
acter are the investigations and reports with respect to the pollution of boundary
waters, the regulation of the level of the Lake of the Woods, the St. Lawrence
Waterway System, and the matter of the Trail smelter. This latter case is
concerned not with boundary waters but rather with the drifting of fumes
[produced by the Trail Smelter in British Columbia] across the boundary into
the Columbia River Valley in Washington.
The author, discussing, in an interesting fashion, these cases, the various
power projects, and the dredging projects in the furtherance of navigation,
develops the importance of the Commission in the settlement of questions arising
between the two countries along a boundary of more than 3500 mile which,
but for the Commission, might be fruitful of dissension and misunderstanding.
The discussion of the St. Mary and Milk River situation shows an apprecia-
tion of the questions involved and of the proper interpretation of the functions
of the Commission under Article VI of the Treaty of 1909. Likewise, the
discussion of the Commission's powers and the necessity for joint action by
the two Governments in bringing cases before the Commission under Article
IX of the same Treaty shows that the author has not only brought together a
great amount of useful material arranged systematically, so as to portray the
history of the International Joint Commission, the situation that called forth
its existence, its functions and its work, but has also applied to important
phases of the Treaty a marked degree of thought and reasoning. In discussing
the various aspects of the -work of the Commission, the author has covered a
very broad field of subjects, practically all of which are of great importance
to the Governments of the United States and Canada and to private interests
in the respective countries. The St. Lawrence Waterway Project, for example,
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involving a total expenditure by the United States and Canada of approximately
five hundred millions of dollars and opening up to ocean-going vessels, the
interior of both countries, with its vast natural resources, wealth, and popu-
lation, presents live international questions in which students of economics and
international cooperation must be interested.
While expressing approval of the work as a whole and recommending it to
students and others interested in this important phase of our relations with
a great neighboring country, I may be permitted to remark that the analysis
of Lake of the Woods Treaty of 1925 might have been more complete. It is
stated that the two Governments adopted the report of 1917 of the Inter-
national Joint Commission with respect to regulating the level of the Lake,
"although it was only in 1925 that a treaty was concluded between them for
the purpose of installing an International Board to regulate the levels." This
Board, it is stated, "is required to assume jurisdiction over the discharge from
the lake (which occurs in Canadian territory) when the level falls below the
minimum of 1056 sea level datum provided in the treaty", and that it is also
the duty of the Board to report upon the', "suitability and sufficiency of pro-
tective works which the treaty seems to require the United States to construct."
The creation of the International Board of Control was a secondary feature
of the Treaty of 1925. The purpose of the Treaty was to regulate the level of
the Lake to prevent further damage from the extreme fluctuations in such level,
to provide protective -works at certain points, to acquire a flowage easement
necessitated by the elevation (under the Treaty) of the normal level of the
Lake by approximately two feet, and to settle the damages resulting from the
artificial level at which it had been held in the past by virtue of the obstruc-
tions in the outlets in Canada. To provide these protective works and the
flowage easement, the Government of Canada paid to the Government of the
United States $275,000 pursuant to Article X of the Treaty. The International
Board, to which the author refers, not only has jurisdiction when the level of
the Lake falls below 1056 sea level datum, but it also has jurisdiction when
the level rises above 1061.25 sea level datum, each of these stages being regarded
as dangerous from the point of view of interests on the Lake--navigation,
fishing, agriculture, etc. There can be no doubt that the 1925 Treaty (Article
VIII) specifically requires the United States to construct the protective works
to which the author refers. The construction of these works and the assess-
ment of damages to the owners of property abutting on the Lake in the United
States are still under way and have been the subject of reports to Congress
by the Secretary of War and of several Acts of Congress. These matters, it
is believed, might properly have been discussed by the author.
In the "Notes on the Map" (pate 10), the author states, with respect to the
Lake of the Woods, that, at the request of the two Governments, "the Com-
mission drafted a Treaty, which was subsequently signed, creating these two
boards, [referring to the Canadian Lake of the Woods Control Board and the
International Lake of the Woods Control Board] which have now been in
operation for several years." As a matter of fact, the International Joint
Commission was never asked to and did not draft a treaty regarding the Lake
of the Woods. The only draft treaty ever submitted to the two Governments
by the Commission was that with respect to the pollution of boundary waters.
I heartily commend the book, not only because of its thorough exposition of
important data-historical and economic,-but also because of its narration
of a successful and interesting experiment by two countries in the adjustment
of international questions.




CASES ON PARTNERSHIP. By Charles E. Clark and William 0. Douglas. St.
Paul: West Publishing Co. 1932. pp. xv, 743. $5.50.
THE preface to this book announces that, "One object has been to secure a more
realistic arrangement." It does not appear to the writer of this review that
this purpose has come to as complete a degree of accomplishment in this book
as has been done in some of the recent case books in other fields. There are
now in use several published case books and a number of mimeographed col-
lections of teaching material which, both in the arrangement of material, the
designation of categories, and actual content of cases reported, seem to have
gone farther than the present book in emphasizing the realistic as opposed to
the conceptual or fundamental analysis of the subject matter in hand.
These other books so far as known to the present writer are not in the field
of partnership and perhaps should not be compared with it. It is probably not
equally easy to work out a satisfactory functional classification of teaching
materials in all of the several categories into which lawyers are accustomed to
subdivide the law. The writer has been trying for nearly three years to fit a
satisfactory body of content material into his own idea of a realistic outline
of the subject of Negotiable Instruments and still does not know how it is
going to come out.
In the chapter and section headings of the book offered by Professors
Clark and Douglas, one finds a distinct departure from the conceptualistic ap-
proach as outlined in the tables of contents of the older Partnership casebooks.
It is difficult for the reader of the book who has not tested it in the classroom
to say just how "self executing" this skeleton of the subject will be in affording
the students a whole-hearted functional treatment of partnership law. It should
be very easy for the most thorough-going legal fundamentalist to give his class
an irreproachably orthodox course in partnership from this book. On the other
hand, of course, the realists do teach the rankest heresy about the "fundamental
legal principles" from the old fashioned books.
It is very likely that it would be impossible to make a selection of cases on
the law of partnership which would go far towards bringing to the subject enough
of the fresh breeze of judicial realism to sweep away very much of the fog of
conceptual formalism with which the subject is so extensively obscured. Partner-
ship law seems to have almost more than its share of formalism. In the first
place we have the controversy as between the entity and aggregate theories as
to the nature of a partnership. As the editors of this book point out in their
footnote on page 6, "It is interesting to inquire, in connection with each topic
of partnership law, how important in practical result this question of theory
is." It may be added that it is also interesting to inquire, in connection with
each topic, how consistent were the draftsmen of the Uniform Partnership Act,
in their adherence to their avowed adoption of the aggregate theory.
This book is divided into two parts. Part one is entitled "Liabilities and
Assets" and is subdivided into three chapters. The first chapter deals with
liabilities and consists of a group of cases covering the question of "Powers
of Partners", as they would be designated in the older books. The second chapter
on assets indicates the sources from which liabilities may be satisfied. The
third chapter deals with the distribution and marshalling of assets. Part two
of the book is called "Management" and consists of two chapters, one of which
deals with the conduct and control of the business and the other with the en-
forcement of rights inter se and against third persons.
Our editors tell us that they have subordinated the question of what is
a partnership. This seems to have been done chiefly by putting it in the second
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chapter under a section heading, "Property of those disputing the relationship."
This material usually appears in the first chapter of partnership case-books.
On the other hand, the material involving the powers of partners, which comes
first in the present book, is usually found in: a later chapter. In the heading
of this second chapter we are told that we are about to deal with the problem,
"What assets are subjected to satisfying partnership liabilities." When we got
into this material, we find that it includes many of the old familiar cases which
have been used in all the case-books in discussing the tests of what constitutes
a partnership. This new designation of the chapter and sections may tend to
increase the probability that the student will discover, or the instructor point
out, the functional basis for the routine syllogistic formulae by which losses
are shifted in the various transactions involving unincorporated business units.
In the type situation treated in these chapters the ordinary problem of
course is simply the question: "Will A's property be seized through the power
of government to satisfy claims arising out of another man's doings?" The
answer is, "Yes, if A is partner of such other men in such doings." Then the
question arises, "Who is a partner?" This in turn is answered, "A partner is
one who etc., etc." The order of the questions asked or the syllogisms employed
to answer them makes little difference. Any device in the preparation of study
material is useful to the extent that it will assist in making clear that the
problem calling for the act of judgment is whether the loss should be shifted or
left where it is; and any scheme is valuable which will help to bring some order
out of the chaos of judicial answers to the question.
On the whole the use of this book should increase the probability that the
course on partnership will be taught with less emphasis on conceptualism than
if some of the older books were used. On the other hand the writer has been
unable to convince himself that it will be easier to teach partnership, or to
make interesting, a particularly uninteresting subject, with this book rather
than with some of the other recent case books on the subject.
My feeling is that if this book had come out a few years ago I should have
welcomed it joyously. Just before Crane and Magruder's first edition was
published, one looked in vain for( a newer case book to take the place of the
excellent but out of date Gilmore. Now there are so many new books in this
field that one is at a loss to make the best selection. The present book does
not seem to the reviewer to be as different from some of the other recent case
books on the same subject as might have been expected from these editors.
The size of the Clark and Douglas book in point of cases included is highly
commendable. There are 168 cases. This, is one of the few case books avail-
able for a course of two semester hours in which there is a reasonable pos-
sibility of covering the material provided. The supplementary material by way
of cases, some part of which is printed in full size type, is unusual. This
material is in turn supported by extensive fine print footnotes. In consequence
of this abundant supplementary material the book extends to 743 pages, not-
withstanding the small number of cases.
In conclusion it may be said at the risk of repetition, that if there is need
for a new case book on Partnership, this is a very good one. However, in view
of the fact that there are several new case books in this field and also in view
of the new grouping of much of the material in this field under such topics as
"Business Associations" or "Business Units" (in which Mr. Douglas has been
a leader) one may wonder whetheV the labor of the editors will be rewarded by
a satisfactory market. Will not most of the "realists" prefer the new grouping
while the "conceptualists" cling to a more familar arrangement of material
and a more orthodox designation of categories9,
University of South Dakota. L. W. FE.zEn.
BOOK REVIEWS
FONTES JURis GENTIUM. Edidit Viktor Bruns. Digest of the Diplomatic
Correspondence of the European States, 1856-1871. Berlin: Carl Hey-
mams Verlag. 1932. Volume I, part I. pp. 432.
Ibid. Digest of the Decisions of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, 1922-1930. Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag. 1931. Volume I,
parts 1 and 2. pp. 260.
Ibid. Digest of the Decisions of the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
1902-1928. Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag. 1931. pp. 306.
Ibid. Decisions of the German Supreme Court relating to International
Law, 1879-1929. Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag. 1931. pp. 943.
THEsE several works, products of the scientific research of the Institut fOr
auslandisches 5ffentliches Recht und Vilkerrecht at Berlin, are, in my opinion,
the outstanding contributions to the apparatus of international law since the
publication of Moore's Digest of International Law. In making available source
material, they attest the conviction that an accurate knowledge of the past
is the most reliable guide for human progress, an axiom sometimes lost sight
of in the concoction of 'intricate schemes for international government. At
all events, Professor Bruns and his collaborators have in these volumes made
available in readily accessible form an essential part of the materials out of
which international law is compounded.
The method adopted in all four works is to classify the material digested
or reprinted according to a topical outline of international law, so that a
particular subject may be pursued through the various sources analyzed. The
.headings are given in three languages-German, French, and English. But
the digest itself varies in this respect. In the diplomatic correspondence, the
extracts are reproduced in the original language and, if this is not one of the
three more current languages, are accompanied by a translation, if an official
one was published. The extracts from the decisions of the Permanent Court
of International Justice are reproduced in the two official languages, French
and English, only, whereas the opinions of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
are digested in the three languages mentioned. So also are the opinions of
the German Supreme Court; but the appropriate parts of the decisions them-
selves, which follow the Digest, are printed in the original only. The sources
are always indicated, and simple yet ingenious mechanical devices facilitate the
work of the investigator.
Perhaps the most unique of the volumes under review is the Digest of Euro-
pean diplomatic correspondence, 1856-1871. Here material is uncovered which
in large part has been a closed book to the student of international law. A
great mass of official and unofficial collections of documents have been laid
under contribution to produce this, the first of four volumes on the period, and
the colossal and thoughtful character of the enterprise is evident throughout.
Classification of such material and judgment on its importance call for the
highest degree of editorial skill and acumen. That capacity is apparent on
every page. The material from the Permanent Court of International Justice
and the Permanent Court of Arbitration is perhaps more accessible than the
diplomatic correspondence, but its classification under familiar topical headings
will give it a currency it would not otherwise possess. The opinions of the
German Supreme Court will embody, for most students, a new source of in-
vestigation for international law, and the profession will observe with interest
the prolific contributions of that Court to the subject.
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One reviewer, in speaking of the digest of decisions, made the remark that
not all the extracts quoted could properly be considered international law.
Certainly not; and it does not give much credit to the editors to assume that
they thought so. What they have done is to make generally available expres-
sions of opinion on legal questions coming from authoritative sources. The
weight to be given to those opinions is a matter for the investigator to deter-
mine for himself, but he needs all the light he can get to determine how much
importance to attribute to a particular dictum, view, or announced rule. That
light, these materials help to afford. Political views on many topics are occa-
sionally assembled, and here also it is the investigator's task to evaluate for
himself these official opinions or arguments.
The volumes under review should inspire scholars in every country to make
available their national contributions to the field of international law, a work
largely performed for the United States by Judge Moore. That celebrated
pioneer has also made known and is now further exploring the adjudications
of international tribunals. The present digests indicate how much is still to
be done in uncovering source materials. In the meantime, these volumes stand
as a monument to the imagination, resourcefulness, and industry of one of the
keenest and most eminent of European scholars, Professor Viktor Bruns, founder
of the distinguished Institut over which he presides, and leader of an able group
of collaborators from whom international law has already received much.
Yale School of Law. EDWIN M. BORCHAIM.
AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS. Introductory Sirvey and Marriage. By Chester
G. Vernier, assisted by Fred A. Weller. Volume I. Stanford University:
Stanford University Press. 1931. pp. xxii, 311. $5.
THis volume, the first of a proposed series which is to cover the whole field
of domestic relations, deals only with the law of marriage, including the con-
tract to marry. The editor gives iri each section: (1) a brief summary of
the common law; (2) the statutory law; (3) comment and criticism; (4) a
selected list of references, including texts, case books, annotations, reports,
articles, and case notes from law magazines.
This is a solid piece of work, well done. It will be of great value to any
student of the subject. One should, however, be cautious in using a book of
this kind. The emphasis is on legislation. Perhaps no branch of the law
is at one and the same time so completely and sa incompletely statutory. In
every state the whole topical range of marriage and divorce has been covered
by statute, and yet, as Bishop pointed out many years ago, most of the statutory
provisions are declaratory and jurisdictional or else formal. That is to say,
statutes have generally conferred jurisdiction upon courts, usually, at the
outset, courts of equity, to grant relief which they did not have inherently, or
confirmed a jurisdiction which they had assumed, taking for granted a sub-
stantive law which rests upon the English common law, in this subject largely
ecclesiastical.
There has been no complete or even very extensive statutory overhauling of
the substantive law anywhere. When a statute has enacted new law it has
had reference chiefly to formal matters of license, ceremony and the like. The
result is that the substantive law is in its technique and in its essential nature
common law, but a common law of the statutes, a strange mixture of statutory
jurisdiction, ecclesiastical origins, and equity practice.
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